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LEARNING FROM LEBANON 
Airpower and Strategy in Israel’s 2006 War against Hezbollah 
Benjamin S. Lambeth
rom 12 July until 15 August 2006, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) waged a 
thirty-four-day war against the Iranian terrorist proxy organization Hezbollah 
in response to a well-planned raid by a team of Hezbollah combatants from 
southern Lebanon into northern Israel. That raid resulted in the abduction of 
two IDF soldiers, who had then been taken back into Lebanon for use as hos-
tages.1 Code-named Operation CHANGE OF DIRECTION, the greatly escalated 
counteroffensive that the raid prompted has since been widely regarded as the 
IDF’s most inconclusive combat performance in Israel’s history. Waged under 
the direction of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and his minister of defense at the 
time, Amir Peretz, the campaign was dominated by precision standoff attacks 
by the Israel Air Force (IAF) and by IDF artillery and battlefield rockets, with 
no significant commitment of conventional ground troops until the last days of 
fighting before a cease-fire went into effect.
What mostly accounted for the frustration felt throughout Israel as the con-
flict unfolded was the fact that at no time during the thirty-four days of combat 
were IDF forces able to stem the relentless daily barrage of short-range Katyusha 
rockets that Hezbollah fired into civilian population centers in northern Israel 
until the cease-fire finally ended that deadly harassment.2 Beyond that, the war’s 
achievements fell well short of what Prime Minister Olmert had promised the 
Israeli people at the campaign’s start, namely, an unconditional return of the two 
abducted soldiers and a decisive crushing of Hezbollah as an effective military 
presence in southern Lebanon. The IDF’s lackluster performance severely un-
dermined the long-standing image of Israel’s invincibility in the eyes of the Arab 
world and the West. It also reflected manifold failures in strategy choice at the 
highest levels of the Israeli government, both uniformed and civilian. 
F
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The IDF’s chief of staff at the time, Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, had pre-
viously served as commander of the IAF and was the first airman ever to have 
occupied the country’s top military position. Because his initial response to 
Hezbollah’s provocation was to rely almost exclusively on precision standoff at-
tacks for their hoped-for coercive effects rather than opt for a concurrent large-
scale commitment of IDF troops on the ground, the campaign’s less than decisive 
outcome led many to conclude afterward that because he was an airman he had 
succumbed to a natural belief that airpower alone would suffice. 
Furthermore, in a widespread early inference that persists to this day, many 
also adjudged that because of Halutz’s initial choice of a strategy that forwent any 
significant use of ground forces, the IDF’s eventual disappointing performance 
attested, at bottom, to a “failure of airpower.” That premature and baseless infer-
ence ignored the important fact that from its initial moments onward the IDF’s 
counteroffensive entailed not only around-the-clock strikes by IAF fighters and 
attack helicopters but also thousands of daily rounds of ground-force artillery 
and rockets fired into southern Lebanon against enemy targets, as well as covert 
hit-and-run raids into Hezbollah-infested territory by teams of Israeli special 
operations forces (SOF). Nevertheless, as a British Royal Air Force officer writing 
almost a year after the fighting ended observed, in commenting on the range of 
public impressions of the campaign experience to date, the idea that the IDF’s 
flawed performance reflected a simple “failure of airpower” rather than an ac-
cumulation of larger sins of omission and commission by the Israeli civilian and 
military leadership “appeared at the time to be the most general understanding 
of this particular campaign within the more thoughtful elements of the media.”3
All the same, a duly informed understanding of the campaign’s essence must 
recognize that the Olmert government’s chosen initial move for responding to 
Hezbollah’s provocation was never simplistically an air-only gambit but rather a 
resort to standoff attacks that also included heavy use of IDF ground-force artil-
lery and rockets. In this situation not just Halutz but also his civilian superiors 
and the IDF’s leading ground commanders were not ready, at least at the outset, 
to commit to a major land push into southern Lebanon, owing to the high troop 
casualties that any such resort would inevitably produce. Without question, ma-
jor errors in situation assessment and strategy choice were made by the topmost 
Israeli leadership, errors that were directly responsible for the campaign’s less 
than satisfactory outcome. Yet if anything “failed” in this accumulation of poor 
leadership judgment calls, it was not Israeli airpower or any other instrument of 
warfare per se but rather a blend of ill-founded military and civilian decisions at 
the highest level with respect to the nature and aims of Israel’s opponent; initially 
avowed goals that were unachievable through any mix of military force that the 
Israeli people and the international community would likely countenance; the 
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ultimate choice of a strategy for pursuing the campaign’s objectives; and the 
government’s mismanagement of public expectations as the counteroffensive 
unfolded.
THE HIGHLIGHTS OF IDF COMBAT OPERATIONS
The casus belli for Israel’s second Lebanon war came at 9:05 on the morning of 12 
July 2006, when a well-practiced team of Hezbollah terrorists crossed the border 
at an unmonitored point and ambushed an IDF patrol during a fleeting vulner-
able moment, killing three soldiers, capturing two more, and taking the latter 
back into Lebanon. Once the IDF’s Northern Command became aware that one 
of its patrols had failed to check in, it immediately declared a HANNIBAL incident 
(for a suspected troop abduction) and dispatched another detachment equipped 
with a Merkava tank to search for the missing soldiers. Immediately after that 
unit crossed into southern Lebanon in pursuit of the abductors, it got suckered 
into a trap, resulting in the Merkava’s being blown up by a mine and four more 
soldiers being killed. The event was observed by an IAF unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) orbiting overhead, and streaming electro-optical and infrared imagery of 
the explosion was transmitted in real time to monitors in IDF command posts 
and operations centers throughout Israel. 
The first IAF contribution to the gathering campaign was a two-plane element 
of attack helicopters that had been launched to investigate the successive inci-
dents. As soon as he learned of the abduction, Minister of Defense Peretz autho-
rized the immediate execution of two preplanned response options—attacking
all of Hezbollah’s positions along the Lebanese border with Israel and closing 
off likely escape routes deeper inside Lebanon with quick-reaction air attacks. 
A little more than an hour later, the first wave of IAF strike fighters crossed into 
Lebanon. In this initial attack wave, F-16s destroyed all of Hezbollah’s observa-
tion posts along the border and dropped the first of numerous bridges across the 
Litani River farther north. Concurrently, units of the IDF’s 91st Division initiated 
massive artillery fire against Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon. 
Shortly after noon that first day, Prime Minister Olmert convened a press 
conference and declared both emphatically and without any foundation in fact, 
“The events of this morning cannot be considered a terrorist strike; they are acts 
of a sovereign state that has attacked Israel without cause.” He further announced 
that his government would assemble that evening to decide on a more definitive 
course of action and that the IDF’s response would be “thundering.”4 
Further compounding that initial misstep, Olmert announced to Israel’s par-
liament five days later, in a speech that showed no sign of any serious prior strat-
egy deliberation, four objectives of his government’s intended response—an un-
conditional return of the two kidnapped soldiers by Hezbollah, the establishment 
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of a “new situation” along the Israeli-Lebanese border, enhanced IDF deterrence 
against outside threats, and the disarming and removal of all Hezbollah forces in 
southern Lebanon.5 The first of these avowed goals was excessive to a fault, since 
all Hezbollah’s leader, the fiery terrorist Hassan Nasrallah, would need to do to be 
able to claim “victory” would be to refuse to return the abducted soldiers, thereby 
depriving Olmert of the ability to make good on his promise to the Israeli people. 
More important, it also was counter to Halutz’s more realistic determination 
that any notion of seeking a return of the abducted soldiers should be rejected 
forthwith as unattainable—which instantly raises a most basic question as to why 
Halutz accepted it without challenge.6 
Olmert’s second avowed goal was equally a reach, but at least it was achiev-
able in principle, were a bold strategy to be followed. The third raised the obvi-
ous question of how. The fourth declared goal was as extravagant as the first. 
Although likewise achievable in principle, it could only be attained at a cost far 
greater than the Israeli people would most likely have been willing to pay in terms 
of IDF casualties incurred and a renewed Israeli presence in southern Lebanon 
with no end in sight. 
As the first day of IDF strike operations neared an end, it became increas-
ingly clear that the government’s preferred approach, at least for the time be-
ing, would be to rely exclusively on standoff attacks by IAF fighters and attack 
helicopters, supplemented as appropriate by IDF artillery and M270 Multiple-
Launch Rocket System (MLRS) fire against known Hezbollah positions south of 
the Litani, rather than resorting to any early insertion of troops on the ground. 
Several months before, in planning for a possible showdown—of just the sort 
that was now unfolding—against Hezbollah, the IDF’s operations directorate 
had developed two fairly elaborate contingency-response options. The first, 
code-named ICEBREAKER (Shoveret Ha’kerach in Hebrew), called for a precision 
standoff-attack operation lasting from forty-eight to seventy-two hours, along 
with concurrent preparations for a possible limited land counteroffensive to fol-
low promptly thereafter. The second, labeled SUPERNAL WATERS (Mei Marom), 
likewise envisaged several days of standoff-only preparation, a concurrent call-up 
of reserve forces for possible imminent commitment, and either a halt to standoff 
fires alone after forty-eight to seventy-two hours or a determined escalation to 
combined air-land operations aimed at decisively pushing Hezbollah’s forces in 
southern Lebanon north of the Litani River.7
As the crisis gathered, Halutz, determined to avoid any return to what Israelis 
had come to call “the Lebanese mud” (after the IDF’s forgettable eighteen-year 
presence in that country), opted not to implement either of these two preplanned 
options. He chose instead to pursue a standoff-only counteroffensive, at least for 
the moment, out of a desire to forgo needless risk of early troop fatalities, should 
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standoff attacks alone be enough to coerce the desired response on Nasrallah’s 
part. In this considered choice, he gained the ready assent of both Olmert and 
Peretz, who likewise feared implicitly that Israel’s rank and file would be un-
willing to abide the large number of IDF casualties that the alternatives would 
almost surely produce. Accordingly, Halutz issued the order for previously tasked 
IAF fighter squadrons to begin preparing to execute, later that night, a carefully 
planned preemptive strike, code-named Operation MISHKAL SGULI (Specific 
Weight), against Hezbollah’s known and targetable medium-range-rocket stor-
age sites.
Although its success was not publicized at the time by the Olmert government, 
the IAF operation was conducted without a hitch during the early morning hours 
of 13 July. In the course of a thirty-four-minute offensive involving forty F-15I 
and F-16I fighters equipped with imaging infrared targeting pods, only some 
twenty Lebanese civilians (most likely Hezbollah supporters who happened to be 
occupying the targeted structures) were assessed by IDF intelligence afterward as 
having been killed. A senior IAF intelligence officer later characterized the per-
formance as “a case study in operational perfection.”8 
The sudden and unexpected combination of Operation MISHKAL SGULI and a 
determined IAF strike soon thereafter on Hezbollah’s Al Manar television station 
provoked, by way of an escalated enemy response, what two Israeli journalists 
termed “Hezbollah’s rocket war.”9 That sustained reprisal exposed, for the first 
time ever, the full extent of the vulnerability of Israel’s home front to often deadly, 
if militarily ineffective, Katyusha fire from southern Lebanon. In addition to its 
continual barrage of short-range Katyushas, Hezbollah also, for the first time, 
fired a volley of medium-range rockets into northern Israel, several landing near 
the town of Afula, thirty miles south of the Lebanese border. One such rocket 
landed in the suburbs of Haifa during the afternoon of 13 July. That was the 
deepest that Hezbollah had ever struck into Israel.10 The attack had the almost 
instant effect of shutting down Israel’s third-largest city and sending thousands 
of its residents down the southbound highways to escape. 
In response to these escalated acts of enemy aggression, the Olmert govern-
ment raised its own ante in turn by attacking the heart of Hezbollah’s command 
and control complex in the dahiye section of south Beirut. Its air strikes into 
the dahiye began during the early evening of 14 July. All civilians were assessed 
as having previously evacuated the area after the IDF gave a twenty-four-hour 
advance warning of its intent to attack. In the initial wave, some fifteen headquar-
ters buildings were destroyed by two-thousand-pound, satellite-aided GBU-31 
Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) delivered by F-15Is.11 A second target 
complex, consisting of Nasrallah’s personal headquarters and residence, sus-
tained forty JDAM hits within a minute. A senior Israeli official later confirmed 
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that Nasrallah himself had been targeted in that attack.12 The military benefits of 
the attack were negligible; Nasrallah and other top Hezbollah leaders were most 
likely in an underground bunker that could not be breached by the munitions 
employed. Nevertheless, the IDF had deemed the dahiye complex to be so impor-
tant, as the most visible symbol of Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon, that it had 
had no choice but to go after it with all determination.
Shortly thereafter, Hezbollah upped the ante yet again by targeting the Israeli 
naval vessel Hanit (Spear), a Saar-5 corvette built in 1994 and carrying some 
eighty crew members, which was patrolling in Lebanese waters eight miles 
west of Beirut. The attack was conducted by what soon proved to have been an 
Iranian-made variant of the Chinese-developed C-802 antishipping missile, a 
weapon that IDF intelligence had not even known was in Hezbollah’s possession. 
The missile struck the stern of Hanit at 8:42 PM, killing four crew members and 
causing considerable damage. A second missile, targeted against another Israeli 
ship, overflew Hanit and, apparently inadvertently, struck and sank a foreign 
merchant vessel cruising thirty-five miles off the Lebanese coast. Hanit, disabled 
by the C-802 but still afloat, got out of the line of fire and eventually made its 
way back to Ashdod for repairs under its own power. It was later determined that 
the antimissile radar on board Hanit had been out of service the evening of the 
attack, that the watch officer in charge of the ship’s defensive electronic systems 
had turned some of those systems off without informing the captain, and that 
the Israeli naval leadership had never directed its crews at sea to bring their an-
timissile capabilities to alert status—even after the campaign was under way. At 
bottom, Hanit’s crew had not activated its defenses against the possibility of a 
cruise-missile attack because IDF intelligence had not identified such a threat.13 
As a result, the ship was defenseless when it was attacked. 
IDF intelligence officials strongly suspected that a team of skilled Iranian tech-
nical experts had either fired or supervised the firing of the C-802 against Hanit. 
Soon after, the head of the IDF’s operations directorate, Major General Gadi 
Eisenkott, disclosed that the enemy combatants who fired the C-802 had received 
targeting information from Lebanese naval radar stations in Beirut and else-
where. Those facilities were accordingly struck by IAF attack helicopters.14 The 
head of the IDF’s planning directorate, then–Brigadier General Ido Nehushtan 
of the IAF, subsequently reported that the air attacks on Lebanon’s port areas had 
been aimed expressly at eliminating the radar installations said to have supported 
Hezbollah’s attack on Hanit. He added, “We see this [C-802] attack as a very clear 
fingerprint of Iranian involvement.” Nehushtan characterized the struck radar 
facilities as emerging targets of opportunity: “Sometimes new targets come up, 
like the sea radar, that we will go after.”15 In all, ten Lebanese radar stations along 
the coast were struck on 15 July and were either destroyed or disabled. The IDF 
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concurrently imposed a naval blockade along Lebanon’s coast, closing the main 
channel to both incoming and departing traffic.
During the first seven days of fighting, the IAF flew some two thousand fighter 
and attack-helicopter sorties, engaging around 650 targets with more than a 
thousand munitions.16 Yet by the end of that first week it was becoming increas-
ingly apparent that standoff attacks alone would never bring about the Olmert 
government’s declared objectives. All the same, despite that gathering recogni-
tion, Israel’s ground commanders were making it unambiguously clear that they 
had no appetite whatever for a reprise of the massive land invasion that Israel 
had launched into Lebanon in 1982. A former chief of staff, retired lieutenant 
general Amnon Lipkin-Shahak of the ground forces, frankly acknowledged the 
IDF’s deep reluctance to commit a large number of troops to close combat with 
Hezbollah, owing to the all but certain prospect of heavy losses.17 
On 20 July, however, in its largest troop activation in four years, the IDF be-
gan mobilizing three reserve divisions and concurrently broadcast warnings for 
all civilians residing in southern Lebanon to evacuate to safer environs north of 
the Litani. Taken together, those two steps foreshadowed a major Israeli ground 
push sooner or later. As the move to significant ground operations drew nearer, a 
debate arose within Israel’s defense community over whether limited forays with 
SOF teams would suffice or whether the IDF should now commit larger numbers 
of heavy infantry and armored forces. One serving general predicted that the IDF 
would continue to rely mainly on air operations for the time being, out of a hope 
that the United States and the international community would not press Israel for 
an early curtailment of the fighting: “We have no . . . desire to go back in force into 
Lebanon. But if I’m wrong and there’s not enough time and if airpower proves 
ineffective, then we’ll do it.”18 
With the continuing daily onslaught of short-range rocket fire into northern 
Israel, ever more vocal calls began to be heard for a massive ground incursion 
aimed at driving Hezbollah’s forces out of southern Lebanon once and for all. 
The Olmert government, however, continued to opt for the existing, lower-key 
ground operations, out of a clear realization that a major land offensive would 
yield no instant solution to the Katyusha problem. Yet on 26 July, as a reluctant 
but determined IDF ground push drew closer, General Nehushtan, the head of 
the IDF’s planning directorate and an IAF fighter pilot, told Halutz, “Without a 
major ground campaign, the IDF [cannot] stop the Katyusha rockets. You must 
bring this before the government. You need to tell them straight that without 
a major ground operation, we cannot remove the Katyusha threat. If the gov-
ernment does not approve it . . . we should tell them that they must stop the 
campaign now.” The same day, the IDF’s deputy chief, Major General Moshe 
Kaplinsky, likewise went to Halutz: “We can’t go on like this. You must demand a 
7
Lambeth: Learning from Lebanon
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
 90  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
ground offensive at tomorrow’s cabinet meeting.”19 This time Halutz agreed that 
both were right. 
The next day, Olmert’s inner council approved a formal call-up of the now-
mobilizing IDF reservists (some thirty thousand in all), while still ruling out for 
the time being a major escalation on the ground. Only on 1 August, after another 
week of resisting a ground offensive, did the IDF’s leaders finally bow to the inevi-
table and begin preparing for a major incursion into southern Lebanon. This halt-
ing embrace of a major ground assault as the campaign continued to drag on was 
an all but explicit testament to the dawning realization among Israel’s top leaders 
that standoff attacks alone had failed to bring about the government’s avowed 
goals. It also highlighted their gradual understanding that the continuing rocket 
attacks constituted a centerpiece of Hezbollah’s strategic concept of operations. 
The 9 August meeting of Olmert’s cabinet, which the next day yielded the 
decision to commit IDF troops to major combat, was the most momentous lead-
ership gathering of the thirty-four-day confrontation. By then, the IDF had ac-
cepted the inevitability of a large-scale ground push if the government’s eventu-
ally expressed determination to reduce the rate of enemy rocket fire into northern 
Israel was to be honored. To be sure, there remained a deep-seated reluctance at 
all levels to follow through, but the IDF’s leaders saw no other alternative at that 
point. With the benefit of hindsight, had such an alternative been adopted by 
the IDF from the campaign’s start, it might well have produced a more decisive 
outcome for Israel. However, it came instead only at the last possible moment, 
just days before a cease-fire brokered by the United Nations was to go into effect. 
The formal order for forward-deployed Israeli troops to move in force into 
southern Lebanon reached IDF Northern Command’s headquarters at five 
o’clock in the afternoon of 11 August. Two days later, aerial preparation by the 
IAF and insertions of heli-borne Israeli troops into southern Lebanon sought to 
extend the IDF’s ground presence all the way to the Litani. Not surprisingly, the 
IDF suffered its highest casualty rate during those last three days of peak-intensity 
fighting. On 15 August the cease-fire previously agreed to by both sides went into 
effect. At that, civilians in northern Israel at long last emerged from their bomb 
shelters, and Nasrallah, fully mindful of the crucial importance of the war of 
narratives, artfully claimed to have achieved a “strategic and historic victory.”20 
In the war’s eventual tally sheet, the IDF’s ground contribution entailed some 
thirty thousand troops operating in southern Lebanon. As for friendly losses, 
the final report of the Winograd Commission (so named for its chair, Eliyahu 
Winograd, a retired judge) convened by Olmert to assess his government’s per-
formance in the campaign cited 119 IDF troops (half reservists) killed in action, 
628 wounded, and 45 Israeli civilians killed by rocket attacks. Hezbollah claimed 
a mere eighty-one of its fighters killed in action, though the IDF insisted that 
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the true number was substantially higher. Official IDF figures later stated that 
Hezbollah, in fact, lost around six hundred trained combatants—more than a 
tenth of the organization’s estimated total personnel strength.21 For its part, the IAF 
flew nearly nineteen thousand sorties throughout the thirty-four-day campaign. 
Yet as effective as the IAF’s combat performance was in a narrow sense, the 
Olmert government’s originally stated goals of recovering the two abducted sol-
diers and extirpating Hezbollah as a viable fighting force in southern Lebanon 
were not achieved. During the war’s last twenty-four hours Hezbollah fired an 
all-time high of 250 Katyushas into northern Israel, offering a ringing testimony 
to its tenacity and to the IDF’s inability to reduce the rate of short-range rocket 
fire to any significant degree at any time throughout the campaign.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
For the most part, in mission areas in which it naturally excelled the IAF per-
formed to its usual high standards of competence. Indeed, the service exceeded 
the government’s expectations in many respects. Any shortfalls in its effective-
ness were due mainly to an absence of adequate actionable intelligence on such 
vital targets as hidden stockpiles of Katyushas. Bearing credible witness to this 
performance, the Winograd Commission’s final report, issued in January 2008, 
concluded that the IAF had displayed “exceptional capabilities” and had turned in 
some “impressive achievements” throughout the course of the counteroffensive. 
That document further noted that the scope of IAF operations had been “unprec-
edented” and that the service had “executed most of its preplanned assignments 
well.” It added that the service’s performance in some cases “helped to compen-
sate for the severity of the ground force’s failure [in key respects].”22
To be sure, the airspace over Lebanon presented a relatively benign operating 
environment for the IAF. There were no air-to-air threats or significant enemy 
surface defenses to contend with, aside from sporadic fire from infrared surface-
to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery. In all, out of its total of nearly nineteen 
thousand combat and combat support sorties flown the IAF experienced just one 
aircraft loss as a direct result of enemy fire (a CH-53 helicopter during a night 
troop insertion operation during the campaign’s last days) and three more due 
to accidents. As that record well attested, IAF aircrews were essentially able to 
operate with impunity throughout Lebanon’s airspace, enjoying both freedom 
from attack and freedom to attack. The IAF’s most notable combat achievements 
were its unprecedented level of sustained combat-sortie generation, its first-ever 
preemptive attack against an enemy ballistic missile inventory, its skillful integra-
tion of UAVs into both independent air operations and joint air-ground combat, 
and its courageous combat airlift and search and rescue operations under often 
intense enemy fire.23
9
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More than in any previous combat involvement by the IAF, precision strike 
operations played a prominent role in Operation CHANGE OF DIRECTION. 
Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) made up 36 percent of the total number of 
air-delivered weapons expended. For targets in built-up areas, where the avoid-
ance of collateral damage was a major concern, the use of PGMs of various sorts 
was more on the order of 60 percent. In one instance, a series of attacks against 
Hezbollah’s command and control complex in the dahiye sector of south Beirut, 
all of the weapons expended were PGMs of one sort or another. 
Yet alongside these achievements, the IAF also experienced its share of dif-
ficulties throughout the course of the second Lebanon war. Two problem areas 
in particular—Hezbollah’s short-range rockets, which were dispersed across 
southern Lebanon, and unsuccessful attempts to eliminate the terrorist organiza-
tion’s most senior leaders—were occasioned by an absence of adequate real-time 
intelligence regarding the location of those high-value assets. Two other areas in 
which the IAF was fairly faulted both during and after the war—the extent of 
Lebanese noncombatant casualties inflicted by bombing and the associated dam-
age done to Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure and economy—were the results of 
ill-advised targeting choices handed down by the Olmert government. Finally, in 
the realm of air-land integration once ground combat got under way in earnest, 
both the IAF and the IDF’s ground forces later acknowledged multiple break-
downs in their efforts at coordinated joint-force employment resulting from their 
not having routinely conducted serious large-force training exercises throughout 
the preceding six years. During those years, the IDF had been almost exclusively 
fixated on the more immediate and pressing lower-intensity problem of dealing 
with the Palestinian intifada in the occupied territories.
With respect to the intractable Katyusha challenge, Hezbollah fired some 
720 of those short-range rockets into northern Israel during the war’s first week 
alone. Six days of relentless IAF retaliatory attacks on the terrorist organization’s 
key military and infrastructure assets throughout Lebanon did nothing whatever 
to dissuade Nasrallah from continuing this rocket war against Israel. Nor did the 
IAF’s attacks reduce to any significant degree Hezbollah’s ability to keep firing 
Katyushas into Israel virtually at will. By the beginning of the campaign’s third 
week, a steady rain of incoming rockets, an average of 170 or more a day, had 
driven more than a million residents of northern Israel either into bomb shelters 
or to safer haven farther south. This unrelenting onslaught finally drove home 
a clear awareness among Israel’s security principals that the short-range rocket 
challenge presented by Hezbollah was a core strategic threat to Israel’s civilian 
population.
The heart of the IDF’s predicament lay in the fact that the Katyushas were es-
sentially untargetable for standoff attacks. Concentrated within a six-mile-deep 
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strip along Israel’s northern border with Lebanon, the rockets were typically hid-
den in nondescript buildings and storerooms attached to private homes. It was all 
but impossible for fighter aircrews looking through their targeting pods from al-
titudes of twenty thousand feet or higher to distinguish a launcher being readied 
for firing from its surroundings, thanks to Hezbollah’s accomplished techniques 
of dispersal, concealment, and collocation of its launchers with civilian struc-
tures. In addition, enemy rocket squads purposely embedded themselves among 
innocent civilians, whom they used without compunction as human shields, 
posing for the IAF the constant danger of inadvertent noncombatant casualties. 
General Halutz later recalled the persistence of daily harassment by Hezbollah’s 
Katyushas as a “major source of frustration” for the Olmert government.24 Yet 
the IDF’s own failure to undertake any concerted effort to negate the short-range 
rocket threat, or even to take it seriously until the campaign’s last week, was the 
main reason for the counteroffensive’s indecisive conclusion and the associated 
perception that Hezbollah’s survival to fight another day represented an IDF 
failure. From a purely tactical perspective, of course, Hezbollah’s Katyushas, even 
at worst, were like mosquitoes—annoying in the extreme but of no real military 
consequence. Yet Hezbollah’s rockets were comparable in effect to Iraq’s Scuds 
fired into Israel in 1991 in terms of their political and strategic utility—a factor 
that the IDF’s leadership never fully recognized or duly acted on. The problem 
was not so much the actual physical destruction, injuries, and fatalities caused 
by the Katyushas as the intolerable spectacle of large numbers of Israeli citizens 
hunkered down in shelters for days on end as a result of that unending threat. 
Ultimately, to negate the Katyushas in a timely way the IDF would have had to 
go in on the ground in large numbers at least to the Litani River. The Olmert 
government’s determination to avoid high troop casualties at all costs drove the 
IDF to rely instead largely on standoff attack operations rather than undertake 
such a costly land offensive. 
Not long after the cease-fire went into effect, many were quick to fault the 
IAF for having failed to negate the Katyusha threat. That charge, however, was 
without merit. No one in the IAF had ever suggested that such negation was 
something that Israel’s air assets could effectively attempt, let alone ensure. On 
the contrary, the IAF’s leaders freely espoused the opposite view, and their clear 
stance in that respect was well known by the government long before CHANGE 
OF DIRECTION was initiated. Just a month before the crisis broke, the IDF had 
rehearsed its plan for exactly such a situation in a command-post exercise that 
began with an abduction incident much like the one that eventually occurred on 
12 July. At the time, the IAF’s commander, Major General Eliezer Shkedy, made 
it clear that the IAF could not prevent Hezbollah from launching short-range 
rockets at will, that the IAF’s success rate against Katyusha stocks would be only 
11
Lambeth: Learning from Lebanon
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
 94  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
around 3 percent at best, and that effective neutralization of these hidden rockets 
would require determined IDF ground operations.25 An important lesson driven 
home by this experience for the IDF was the absolute need, from the very start 
of any future crisis of a comparable nature, to be more forceful in controlling the 
expectations of both the civilian leadership and the Israeli rank and file regarding 
what airpower could and could not be expected to deliver.26 
THE SECOND LEBANON WAR IN STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE 
As the foregoing discussion has shown in enough detail to make the point, the 
inconclusive result of Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah in no way reflected a 
“failure of airpower,” a gross mischaracterization of the Olmert government’s 
flawed approach that unfortunately remains the predominant view among many 
to this day. The initial belief that the many frustrations experienced by Israelis 
during the second Lebanon war all emanated simply from the parochial pursuit 
of an air-only strategy by the fighter pilot who happened to be serving at the 
time as the IDF’s chief has remained remarkably persistent over time despite 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.27
In fact, the IDF’s combat doctrine that prevailed on the eve of the second Leb-
anon war was in no way air-centric beyond the bounds of reason in the context 
of the many challenges that Israel faces across the conflict spectrum. Although 
a career fighter pilot by background who naturally believed in the transformed 
character of contemporary air warfare capabilities, General Halutz had repeat-
edly voiced balanced views on the evolved role of airpower in joint warfare. He 
freely admitted his long-standing recognition that an air arm by itself, whatever 
its combat advantages, “cannot stick the flag on a hilltop.”28
More important, the doctrinal elevation of precision standoff attack over 
close-quarters ground maneuver as the IDF’s preferred approach to modern 
warfare was not, as many have suggested, a forced concoction by Halutz derived 
from his natural prejudices in favor of airpower. On the contrary, that reorienta-
tion had been first instituted several years before the second Lebanon war by the 
IDF’s then–chief of staff, Ehud Barak, a ground-forces general. Barak had deter-
mined that in light of recent technology improvements and the accumulation of 
American aerial-warfare successes since Operation DESERT STORM, the primary 
focus of IDF options planning for major contingencies should be, as one Israeli 
scholar put it, “on fire and not on maneuver, on neutralizing the enemy and not 
on decisively defeating it via conquest of territory.”29
Finally, Halutz had scarcely been left unprepared by his upbringing as an 
airman to serve in the position of IDF chief of staff. After the disappointing 
conclusion of Israel’s second Lebanon war, some retired IDF ground force crit-
ics complained that he had spent his entire service life in an antiseptic airman’s 
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/7
 L A M B E T H  95
world totally removed from the gritty realities of “boots on the ground.” Yet 
the fact is that on entering the general-officer ranks Halutz gained exposure to 
ground-force issues to a degree uncommon for an airman, thanks to a succession 
of senior seasoning assignments in Israel’s joint arena. Starting in 1998, he served 
a two-year tour as head of the IDF’s operations directorate. In 2004, after his 
subsequent four-year stint as IAF commander beginning in 2000, he moved up to 
become the IDF’s deputy chief of staff before being picked in 2005 by then–Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon as the first IAF general to be trusted with the nation’s top 
military leadership position. Halutz testified to the Winograd Commission that 
on assuming the position of chief of staff he had felt that he was entering office 
with “a large measure of familiarity with the essence of ground operations.” He 
added that when Barak, by then minister of defense, had appointed him com-
mander of the IAF in 2000, Barak had commented that Halutz was already “the 
greenest blue helmet in the IDF.”30 
True enough, on the surface, and to many unversed in the details of ongoing 
combat operations at the time, the first two weeks of Operation CHANGE OF 
DIRECTION indeed bore ample signs of being an air-only effort. We now know, 
however, with the benefit of subsequent revelations regarding the Olmert govern-
ment’s inner deliberations as the campaign unfolded, that Halutz never insisted 
on such an approach based on a belief that it offered the most promising solu-
tion to mission needs. On the contrary, after the campaign ended he declared 
categorically in response to charges that he had wrongly sought to achieve the 
government’s goals with an air-only strategy, “I never said an aerial campaign 
would suffice [for the IDF] to prevail. The original plan was to combine an aerial 
campaign with a [possible eventual] ground maneuver.”31 
Halutz also stressed repeatedly that he had never used the term “airpower” in 
characterizing his counteroffensive plan. Rather, what he had sought to employ 
to useful effect was standoff firepower. The IDF’s response to Hezbollah’s provo-
cation of 12 July, Halutz rightly emphasized, was neither initiated as, nor ever 
envisaged as being, an air-only campaign. In clear testimony to that fact, IDF 
operations from the campaign’s first day until the cease-fire went into effect also 
included the firing of some 173,000 artillery shells and MLRS rounds, more than 
were expended during the much more intense Yom Kippur War of 1973.32
If the flaws in the IDF’s performance during its second Lebanon war did not 
emanate from misplaced reliance on the assumed promise of airpower, then 
wherein lies their explanation? The main reason behind the Olmert government’s 
initial strategy for responding to Hezbollah’s provocation was simply that no one 
among the senior Israeli leadership, military or civilian, wanted an open-ended 
ground war. It was not as if, as one American commentator later put it, General 
Halutz was somehow “guilty of ‘preventing’ the ground forces from otherwise 
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carrying out their preferred and the optimum plan.”33 The IDF’s ground com-
manders were equally opposed to a major land push for numerous reasons, not 
least of which was the fact that Israel’s ground forces were unprepared for major 
combat against a robust opponent like Hezbollah, having conducted only do-
mestic policing actions against the Palestinian resistance during the preceding 
six years.
Yet at the same time, Halutz wanted to teach Hezbollah a lesson that its leaders 
would not soon forget. Ever since the IDF’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon 
in 2000, Nasrallah’s combatants had systematically taken up positions vacated by 
the departing Israeli forces. The preeminent challenge for the IDF in that situa-
tion, it naturally followed, was to contain Hezbollah’s looming military presence, 
notwithstanding the many tactical advantages that the terrorist organization ac-
crued from its new perches just across the Lebanese border. 
During his previous assignment as the IAF’s commander, Halutz had main-
tained that the Barak government’s policy of answering with restraint Hezbollah’s 
continued tests of the limits of Israel’s tolerance—unprovoked border incidents 
and random rocket firings into northern Israel—was prejudicial to the nation’s 
security interests. He later demanded, in an order to the IDF’s operations director-
ate in May 2006, a concrete contingency plan against Hezbollah.34 With the final 
provocation of the abduction on 12 July 2006, Halutz decided that the time had 
come to engineer a sea change, to implement a fundamentally different approach
—hence his decision to code-name the IDF’s counteroffensive Operation 
CHANGE OF DIRECTION. 
In any case, the decision to begin the campaign with standoff-only attacks 
was not Halutz’s alone. It was the consensus view among Israel’s top civilian and 
military leaders, because it appeared to be the country’s best available option as 
an initial response. As Lieutenant General Shaul Mofaz, a land combatant, former 
IDF chief of staff, and serving member of Olmert’s cabinet, later explained in his 
testimony to the Winograd Commission, “If you can do it from the air, it is better. 
I do not believe any of us would want to use ground forces if you can attain [your 
objectives] otherwise.”35 
Another reason for initiating the counteroffensive with standoff-only attacks 
was the leadership’s keen appreciation that, as noted above, Israel’s ground forces 
were not ready for major combat. As one IDF unit commander later recalled in 
this regard, “Our main problem was that everyone in the army knew what had to 
be done, and [yet] no one wanted to do it, especially since we knew that it would 
cost us a lot of casualties.”36 During the government’s initial deliberations over 
such a daunting strategy alternative, the IDF’s deputy chief, General Kaplinsky, 
and other land force generals warned Olmert that a major ground invasion could 
cost the IDF as many as four hundred soldiers killed in action.37
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In his memoirs published in 2010, Halutz reminded readers of the more mod-
est goals that he had issued to the IAF and to Northern Command: “The IDF 
embarked on the Lebanon II war with predefined aims. These aims were limited. 
Not one of them defined the war as aiming to destroy, crush, or wipe out the 
Hezbollah organization from the map of Lebanese reality.”38 Yet the inescapable 
fact remains that the former IDF chief ’s prime minister had avowed precisely 
such a goal, to all intents and purposes, in a public pronouncement six days into 
the campaign. That declaration by the nation’s top leader gave instant rise to un-
realistic expectations on the part of the Israeli public, expectations that the IDF 
lacked the wherewithal to fulfill with any combination of air and ground forces 
that domestic and international opinion would likely countenance. Worse yet, it 
played perfectly into Nasrallah’s hands by allowing him to claim at the campaign’s 
end, with complete credibility in the eyes of the Arab world and of most Western 
observers, that Hezbollah had emerged “victorious” from the IDF’s counter-
offensive simply by having survived.
On this point, important for a proper understanding of where the IDF’s 
campaign plan ultimately went wrong, Halutz remarked in passing and all but 
dismissively in his memoirs that “among the public and also at the political level, 
there were unrealistically high expectations that were built, among other things, 
by flawed public relations.”39 Yet as correct as that statement was, strictly speaking 
and as far as it went, it was exactly that palpable disconnect that in the end proved 
most consequential. The disconnect between what the prime minister had prom-
ised the Israeli people during the campaign’s first week and what the IDF had set 
about more modestly to accomplish on the battlefield yielded an outcome that 
gave both self-interested and neutral onlookers alike every reason to conclude 
that the IDF’s counteroffensive had ended in “failure.” 
In fact, Prime Minister Olmert, seemingly on impulse, promised consider-
ably more during the campaign’s first week than all of Israel’s forces together 
could possibly have delivered at a price that anyone in the country would have 
been willing to pay. For his part, General Halutz evidently failed to preempt that 
egregious overreach by making it unambiguously clear to his political superior 
beforehand what the IDF could and could not do. As a result, he and Olmert 
marched to different drummers throughout the campaign, a fact that was largely 
responsible for the mounting sense among the Israeli people and most outside 
observers as the endgame neared that Israel had failed to achieve its avowed goals. 
Nasrallah lost no time in leveraging the point for maximum propaganda value 
by claiming a “divine victory” for Hezbollah as the cease-fire went into effect.40
In the end, informed observers can reasonably disagree in hindsight about the 
appropriateness of Halutz’s standoff-only initial move for Operation CHANGE 
OF DIRECTION. That choice, it bears repeating, was shared at first not only by the 
15
Lambeth: Learning from Lebanon
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
 98  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Olmert government’s top civilian leaders but also by the IDF’s leading ground-
force commanders. Yet it is all but impossible to avoid concluding that for what-
ever reason, Halutz failed to prevent his prime minister from writing a check that 
the IDF could not cash—that is, from articulating unattainable goals on the cam-
paign’s sixth day and thereafter allowing them to persist in the minds of Israeli 
citizens and outside observers. That lapse had profound adverse consequences 
for how the campaign has been viewed ever since, however more tolerably, and 
even positively, that matters may ultimately have turned out for Israel—a point 
to which we will return. 
There was nothing wrong in principle with the Olmert government’s deci-
sion to respond to Hezbollah’s provocation with escalated force. Yet its chosen 
response was apparently not explored in all its ramifications before being set in 
motion. Clearly there was more than one conceivable alternative available to the 
IDF in the immediate aftermath of the provocation. By all signs, however, those 
alternatives were not systematically identified, explored, or rank-ordered by the 
civilian leadership or General Halutz. As a result, the IDF initiated its counterof-
fensive without anyone in the government’s having given adequate thought to the 
campaign’s likely conclusion.
An especially glaring deficiency in the government’s chosen approach was that 
from the very start it offered no ready way of dealing with Hezbollah’s Katyusha 
fire should coercion solely through standoff attacks fail to elicit the desired result. 
A no less glaring failure of situation assessment and strategy, this time particu-
larly on the IDF’s part, was that until very late stemming the rate of short-range 
rocket fire into northern Israel was never high on its list of priorities. Indeed, 
both the IDF’s uniformed principals and the government’s civilian leaders mis-
understood fundamentally the strategic significance of the Katyushas until they 
finally awakened, in the campaign’s last days, to the corrosive effect that the unre-
lenting, daily rocket fire was having on Israeli morale. Until then, their tendency 
had been to dismiss the Katyushas as representing merely a nuisance factor. 
Yet another shortcoming in the IDF’s planning and conduct of the war was a 
failure of insight into the true essence of the opponent it was facing. Indeed, Is-
rael’s entire security establishment erred in not recognizing from the campaign’s 
start that it was fighting not just a homegrown Lebanese terrorist organization 
but a well-equipped and well-resourced vanguard of Iran. An associated issue 
here has to do with what was needed to defeat a stateless opponent, a challenge 
that entailed a fundamentally new paradigm of combat. Nasrallah, for his part, 
as the IAF’s Brigadier General Itai Brun later pointed out, “correctly identified 
Israel’s need for a clear and unambiguous victory in a short war. Thus, Hezbollah 
only had to survive” and to demonstrate its survivability by continuing to fire 
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rockets at a peak rate right up to the cease-fire. Hezbollah’s strategy was, at its 
heart, “victory through nondefeat.”41 
In hindsight, the immediate challenge presented to Prime Minister Olmert and 
his government by Hezbollah’s provocation of 12 July 2006 was clear and simple. 
If going in on the ground massively from the very start was unacceptable, then 
the proper opening move by the IDF should instead have been a sharp but short 
standoff reprisal with the aim of causing as much physical harm to Hezbollah’s 
military infrastructure as possible within a finite period of time. With Nasrallah 
having thus been made to feel the greatest possible pain for his transgression, the 
punitive response would then have been abruptly halted, in the satisfaction that 
a clear message had been sent to Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsors. 
If, alternatively, the Olmert government had deemed it essential to eradicate 
once and for all Hezbollah’s ability to rain at will short-range rocket fire on in-
nocent Israeli civilians, a properly targeted campaign of precision standoff at-
tacks accompanied by a large-scale ground counteroffensive to regain control of 
southern Lebanon up to the Litani River was the only serviceable option. Either 
way, the image of Israel and the credibility of its deterrent would be preserved. 
No halfway solution would have worked, and yet that is exactly the kind of option 
that the Olmert government attempted to find in the end.
All of that said, looking back on Israel’s second Lebanon war six years later, 
one can fairly ask whether the IDF’s campaign was really that much of a lost 
cause after all. To begin with, it was easy enough for Nasrallah to proclaim in the 
war’s early aftermath that he had “prevailed” simply by virtue of having survived. 
Yet the fact is that as a result of the IDF’s sustained onslaught, his organization 
took a major beating and paid a high price for its abduction of the two Israeli 
soldiers. The IDF by its own accounting killed more than six hundred of his 
most seasoned combatants and severely wounded around a thousand more.42 In 
addition, a considerable portion of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure through-
out Lebanon was destroyed or badly damaged by the IDF’s relentless aerial and 
artillery bombardment. The campaign also made for an instructive experience 
for the IDF, in that it unmasked the true nature of Hezbollah, its strengths and 
weaknesses, how it fights, and the lethality of its Iran-supplied rockets and an-
titank weapons. By undertaking its response with such sustained intensity and 
vigor, Israel showed its determination to deal with Hezbollah using grossly dis-
proportionate measures should a future challenge by the terrorist organization 
be deemed to require such force majeure.
In sum, the IDF’s campaign against Hezbollah was not quite the unqualified 
setback for Israel that many had initially thought. Consider, in this regard, the 
new strategic reality that the second Lebanon war occasioned for both Hezbollah 
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and Israel. From the first weeks of his elevation to Hezbollah’s leadership in 1992 
all the way up to the start of Operation CHANGE OF DIRECTION, Nasrallah had 
lobbed short-range rockets into northern Israel from time to time with madden-
ing regularity and impunity. Yet not a single rocket was fired from Lebanon into 
Israel during the years after the campaign ended until three were launched, des-
ultorily and without effect, during the IDF’s twenty-three-day operation against 
Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009. Even though 
Hezbollah had by that time accumulated more short-range rockets than ever 
before, its leaders were quick to disavow any responsibility for those launches. 
This suggests that Nasrallah’s postcampaign motivations and conduct were most 
decidedly affected by the significant bloodying that was dealt to his organization 
by the IDF in July and August 2006. 
Finally, Hezbollah’s role as a forward combat arm of Iran was starkly drama-
tized by the campaign experience, thus bringing into sharper focus the IDF’s 
already keen appreciation of the seriousness of the Iranian threat. Moreover, 
Israel’s sobering experience during the second Lebanon war drove home the 
emergent fact that a nonstate opponent of Hezbollah’s sophistication was far 
more than just a nuisance factor for the country’s security planning. On the con-
trary, with its revealed ability to hold large numbers of Israeli civilians at risk, the 
radical Islamist movement had in fact become what one Israeli analyst described 
as “a strategic threat of the first order.”43 In light of the substantial setback that 
was dealt by the IDF’s counteroffensive both to Hezbollah as a terrorist organiza-
tion and to the overarching strategic interests of Iran, to say nothing of the calm 
that has prevailed along Israel’s northern border ever since the cease-fire went 
into effect in August 2006, one can fairly say about CHANGE OF DIRECTION what 
Mark Twain once said of Wagnerian opera—it’s not as bad as it sounds. The only 
real remaining downside, as the IAF’s Brigadier General Brun frankly admitted 
in an after-campaign reflection, is that “we [the IDF and the Olmert government] 
failed to protect Israel’s civilian population and did not succeed in shortening 
the war.”44
ON BALANCE
Operation CHANGE OF DIRECTION represented the first time in Israel’s six-
decade history that a major confrontation ended without a clear-cut military 
victory. The campaign’s less than satisfactory outcome for Tel Aviv did not ema-
nate from any particular single-point failure, least of all on the part of the IAF’s 
universally acclaimed combat edge. Rather, in the words of two informed Israeli 
commentators, it stemmed from “an overall accumulation of circumstances.”45 
More to the point, the war’s outcome in no way represented a failure of Israel’s air 
assets to perform to the fullest extent of their considerable, though not unlimited, 
18
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/7
 L A M B E T H  101
capabilities. Instead, it reflected an overarching deficiency in strategy choice, the 
most flawed elements of which were a failure by the IDF to update standing con-
tingency plans for the immediate needs of the challenge at hand; an inconsistency 
between avowed goals, available means, and will to pursue them successfully; and 
placement by the leadership of friendly casualty avoidance above mission accom-
plishment in its rank-ordering of combat priorities.
Viewed in retrospect, it was clearly an overreach for Prime Minister Olmert 
to announce the all but unattainable goal of extirpating, in a single and limited 
combat operation, Hezbollah’s deeply entrenched military presence in southern 
Lebanon. As a former IDF ground force general later observed in this regard, the 
government’s decision to rely mainly on precision standoff attacks rather than to 
commit strength on the ground in pursuit of the prime minister’s ephemeral goal 
stemmed not from any preexisting bias on Halutz’s part in favor of airpower but 
rather from his superiors’ “setting unrealistic objectives . . . and [then] creating 
the illusion that they were achievable . . . at a low price.”46 That is, buying into 
a baseless view of what airpower (or, more correctly, standoff firepower) alone 
could achieve by way of coercing desired enemy behavior was not where the Ol-
mert government went astray. Rather, its most consequential misstep was taking 
an unreflective view of what military power of any kind, unaided by an effective 
strategy, might achieve in a campaign in which declared goals were so ambitious 
and unbounded.
That misstep going into Israel’s war against Hezbollah in July 2006 was round-
ly corrected by the time the IDF was ready, a little more than two years later, to 
embark on its campaign against Hamas in response to similar rocket firings from 
Gaza against civilian population centers in southern Israel. Indeed, if there ever 
was an instance of lessons indicated by one disappointing combat performance 
being truly learned and assimilated by a defense establishment in preparation for 
its next high-stakes showdown, this was an exemplary case in point. The IDF’s 
response to the insights driven home by its sobering experience during the sec-
ond Lebanon war represents a classic example of institutional adaptability and 
self-improvement. As the director of the IDF’s Dado Center for Interdisciplinary 
Military Studies recounted in an after-action reflection on the implications of 
Israel’s response to Hezbollah in 2006, the IDF internalized a substantial number 
of appropriate conclusions from its manifest errors in planning and readiness. 
These conclusions included assessed needs for significant increases in regular 
and reserve ground force training, for renewed emphasis on high- as well as low-
intensity warfare contingencies in planning, training, and force development, 
and for greater stress on cross-service integration in planning and training across 
the entire spectrum of likely future warfare.47 
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For their part, the IAF’s leaders gleaned a similar but more service-specific 
set of conclusions from their rocky experience of working with Israel’s ground 
forces during the second Lebanon war. Those conclusions included a need for 
deeper and more intimate mutual acquaintance and understanding between 
Israel’s air and land warfare communities; joint planning of ground schemes of 
maneuver that routinely include IAF participation from the very start; stronger 
IAF representation at division and brigade levels; and decentralized control of 
attack-helicopter operations in air-land warfare.48 
The IDF’s subsequent twenty-three-day counteroffensive against Hamas in 
the Gaza Strip in late December 2008 and early January 2009 stood in marked 
contrast to the Olmert government’s flawed conduct of the second Lebanon war. 
It was dominated by a more realistic matching of desired ends with available 
means. It also featured a greater willingness by Israel’s political and military lead-
ers to risk paying the campaign’s likely price if need be.49 In the more focused and 
disciplined way in which they planned and carried out their successful campaign 
against Hamas, those leaders substantially erased any residual doubts about the 
credibility of Israel’s deterrent against any would-be regional challengers, for at 
least the near term. 
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